After a series of unprecedented coordinated attacks, carried out across the country on Saturday by Jnim jihadists and Tuareg independence rebels from the FLA, Mali is plunged into uncertainty. What do we know about the situation on the ground? What are the common interests of the two groups? Why is this a hard blow for the Malian regime? Decryption.

Published on: 04/27/2026 - 6:57 p.m. Modified on: 04/27/2026 - 10:05 p.m.

Mali is falling into a major security crisis. After two days of intense fighting, the strategic town of Kidal, in the north of the country, officially fell into the hands of the Tuareg rebels of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the jihadists of the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (Jnim), affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

This takeover was confirmed by a source close to the local governor on Monday April 27, while unprecedented coordinated attacks targeted strategic positions of the junta in Bamako and several large cities on Saturday.

In this context of simultaneous violence on several fronts, the Malian power is facing an unprecedented situation since the 2020 coup d'état. Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed, while General Assimi Goïta, head of the junta, has not been seen and has not spoken since the start of hostilities. France 24 takes stock.

Also read Street fighting and departure of Russian mercenaries: the story of the fall of Kidal in 48 hours

• What do we know about the situation on the ground?

On Monday, a precarious calm seemed to have settled in Bamako and Kati, the epicenter of military power, where fighting was still raging the day before. Markets, schools and offices are open, while the population seems to go about their business as usual. "The populations are in mourning after the announcement of the death of General Sadio Camara", reports Serge Daniel, regional correspondent for France 24. According to his information, shooting was however reported on Monday in Douentza, a town located between Mopti and Gao, "causing the displacement of around sixty civilians".

The only toll announced by the government dates from Saturday evening, when the authorities announced 16 civilian and military injuries and “limited material damage”. Given the violence of the fighting, the actual toll could be significantly higher, particularly among civilians.

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The key town of Kidal, now under the control of Tuareg independence rebels and jihadist groups, saw Russian soldiers from the Africa Corps – a Russian paramilitary organization controlled by Moscow – withdraw from the town. The Tuareg rebels announced that they had reached an “agreement” allowing their withdrawal. “The Russian mercenaries slammed the door after asking for the opening of a humanitarian corridor to return home,” relates Serge Daniel. “The armed groups took down the national flag and the civil authorities left.”

Another setback for the military regime: the confirmed death of General Sadio Camara, Minister of Defense and important figure in the junta. He was killed on Saturday in Kati during an attack claimed by the Jnim against his residence, destroyed by a vehicle bomb. In a press release published on Sunday, the Malian army affirmed that "the hunt for armed terrorist groups continues" in Kidal, Kati and in several localities. The alert level has been raised: curfews, reinforced patrols and increased checkpoints have been established.

• Who are the Jnim and the FLA?

A central actor in the jihadist insurgency in the Sahel, the Support Group for Islam and Muslims is a coalition affiliated with Al-Qaeda, founded in 2017 during the war in Mali. Jnim is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a historic figure in the Tuareg rebellions in the 1990s who became a jihadist. The group advocates the establishment of sharia - Islamic law - in Mali but also in Niger and Burkina Faso. Suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court, the Jnim is increasing attacks against the junta in power in Bamako.

In September 2024, he claimed responsibility for an unprecedented double attack against the Bamako military airport and a gendarmerie school, leaving dozens dead. Several other major attacks claimed by Jnim targeted the Malian army, including a coordinated assault on June 2, 2025, against a camp in the large city of Timbuktu as well as its airport. “The Jnim has learned to adapt to the threat from the Malian army, to dodge it, and to develop a capacity to put pressure on large cities,” analyzes Jean-Hervé Jézéquel, director of the Sahel project at the International Crisis Group. A development marked by increased pressure on “commercial and logistical flows”, continues the expert, including in the capital.

Also read: Will Mali resist jihadism?

For its part, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) is a coalition of predominantly Tuareg armed groups which demand the independence of Azawad, a vast territory in northern Mali. Heir to separatist insurgencies, it is part of the continuity of movements which, for decades, have challenged the authority of the central State - without ever having succeeded in sustainably imposing a balance of power, as shown by the failure of the Algiers peace agreement signed in 2015.

A historically nomadic people spread across several states - Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya and Burkina Faso - the Tuareg have been waging armed struggles against their "marginalization" for decades, particularly around Kidal. Last year, the FLA freed a Spanish hostage kidnapped in Algeria in January 2025, before inflicting a major setback on Malian forces and their Russian allies a few months later in a deadly ambush.

In recent months, the Jnim and the FLA have come together following a meeting of their leaders to join forces against the Malian junta.

• What are their common interests?

It is a return to a scenario that Mali had not experienced since 2012. For the first time since their joint capture of the north of the country - before being ousted by French intervention, during Operation Serval -, jihadists and Tuareg rebels are cooperating again on this scale. “The Jnim and the Tuareg rebels have very little in common, but they share an adversary,” summarizes Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel program at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali. "They know they can't force regime change alone; that's why they're teaming up, like in 2012."

However, this convergence is fragile. “This is a very unstable alliance of circumstance,” insists the expert, recalling that “the jihadists ended up getting rid of the Tuareg” during their previous cooperation.

On the ground, however, this alliance takes a very concrete form. “The agreements concluded more than a year ago between the FLA and the Jnim today result in increased cooperation,” explains Wassim Nasr, journalist specializing in jihadist networks for France 24. He describes “exchanges of skills”: manufacturing explosives, handling heavy weapons, logistics or driving vehicles. The most visible sign of this coordination: the simultaneity of attacks, carried out on several fronts.

Behind this coordination, a clear strategy: “The goal was not to bring down Bamako, but to occupy the army in the capital and in the Center to be able to control the North,” continues Wassim Nasr. In their sights, a shared objective: to weaken the Malian junta and its Russian allies, while strengthening their territorial influence. “There is coordination assumed to resume fighting against the junta but also against the Russians,” he concludes.

• Why is this a hard blow for the Malian regime?

For many observers, the scale and coordination of the attacks mark a turning point in the conflict. “This is a bitter setback for the Malian government […] and a real new phase in the war and insurrection raging in the Sahel,” said researcher Andrew Lebovich, Sahel specialist at the Clingendael Institute. “This clearly shows how difficult it was for the Russian government and its partners to exert control, even around the capital.”

The capacity of armed groups to strike simultaneously in Bamako, Kati or even in the north of the country is "completely unprecedented", he underlines. Even more worrying: the level of preparation for these operations. The fact that fighters were able to be mobilized in large numbers, including on the outskirts of the capital, "without being detected by the authorities" illustrates, according to the researcher, a "precarious" security situation.

See also Attacks in Mali: “A very hard blow” for the junta

On the political level, the shock could also be lasting. “If part of the population continues to support the junta, we are starting to see an erosion of confidence in its ability to manage the situation on the ground and guarantee the safety and security of the Malian people,” analyzes Folahanmi Aina, lecturer at SOAS University in London. Having come to power promising to restore security, the military is struggling to convince: "Since the coup d'état, the data shows that insecurity in Mali and throughout the Sahel region has only gotten worse," he recalls.

• How did the regime rely on the Russians?

Following two coups d'état in 2020 and 2021 which brought to power the junta led by General Assimi Goïta, Mali broke the alliance with the former French colonist to turn militarily and politically towards Russia and its private security company Wagner – which became Africa Corps in June 2025, under the direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defense – to help it in the anti-jihadist fight.

On the ground, this support initially proved decisive. In 2023, Russian paramilitaries offered the Malian army victories in the north of the country, with the recapture of the key bastions of Kidal, Ber and Anéfis from jihadists and Tuareg separatists. “The Russian mercenaries were the frigate of the Malian army,” summarizes France 24 correspondent Serge Daniel, emphasizing their central role in terms of “armament” and “military strategy”.

See also Attacks in Mali: “The bankruptcy of the junta exposed”

But behind these tactical successes, a dependence has set in. “The Russians, with 1,000 or 2,000 mercenaries, cannot really replace the scale of the previous international presence,” recalls Paul Melly, researcher in the Africa program at Chatham House, referring to the 15,000 to 17,000 men deployed at the height of international missions, between the soldiers of Minusma (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) and those of France.

The withdrawal of Russian forces from certain key areas, such as Kidal, should therefore leave an immense void. “From the moment they are no longer there, this constitutes a significant loss for the Malian army in terms of technical skills and tools,” explains Serge Daniel. From now on, Malian soldiers find themselves "alone facing the rebels and jihadists", in a context of increased pressure. “This will shake up the situation on the ground,” he warns.

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