As Lebanon prepares to resume direct talks with Israel, the ghost of the May 17, 1983 agreement—which was signed but never implemented—haunts the new round of negotiations. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam face a smear campaign by Hezbollah, which has already rejected any pact and has even launched veiled threats against the country's leaders.

First modification: 04/23/2026 - 20:53

Since the announcement of a new round of direct talks between Lebanon and Israel, scheduled for this Thursday, April 23, following a first meeting held in Washington earlier this month, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and the country's Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, have been the target of a smear campaign orchestrated by Hezbollah sympathizers.

The head of state, who trusts that the talks will achieve the withdrawal of the Israeli Army from southern Lebanon and a definitive demarcation of the common border, received an implicit death threat from officials of the Shiite party.

The threat was taken seriously in Beirut, given the history of the pro-Iran movement, which has some members convicted by the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) for the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.

Senior Hezbollah official Nawaf Moussaoui warned last Saturday, April 18, in an interview with the party's television channel, 'Al-Manar', that if the Lebanese president "wants to make decisions unilaterally, he is not more important than Anwar al-Sadat," in reference to the Egyptian president who was assassinated in 1981, three years after signing a peace agreement with Israel at Camp David.

Moussaoui added that any negotiations or agreements between Israel and Lebanon would be "rejected, not recognized and sent to the trash, like the agreement of May 17, 1983."

Read alsoAttacks in Lebanon test the truce, amid Beirut-Israel talks in the US.

An agreement that never came into force

That security pact – which was never implemented – was officially signed by Israel and Lebanon through the intermediation of the United States in Khaldeh, near Beirut, during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990). Lebanon, then led by President Amine Gemayel (1982-1988), was at that time simultaneously occupied by the armies of Israel and Syria.

Ambassador Antoine Fattal led the Lebanese delegation, while the Israeli team was led by diplomat David Kimche. Both sides confronted US President Ronald Reagan's envoy, Morris Draper, Undersecretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

The agreement was the result of 35 meetings between Israelis and Lebanese held at the end of December 1982, alternately in both countries. Comprised of a dozen articles, it was intended to be a first step toward lasting peace between the two countries.

Its preamble proclaimed "the end of the state of war" between the two neighbors, who, under article 2, undertook to "resolve their disputes by peaceful means."

The text provided for the creation of a security zone in southern Lebanon, a timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and a commitment by each party not to allow its territory to be used as a base for "hostile or terrorist activities" against the other.

It was even suggested that future negotiations be held on "agreements relating to the movement of goods, products and people, as well as their application without discrimination."

Although it was ratified by the Lebanese Parliament, the agreement was never signed into law by President Gemayel. In March 1984, it was repealed by the Council of Ministers under pressure from Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and his Lebanese allies at the time—the Druze warlord Walid Joumblatt and Nabih Berri, leader of the Shiite Amal militia and president of the Lebanese Parliament since 1992—all of whom were hostile to any agreement with Israel.

Assad, with no small amount of irony, assured Gemayel that the repeal was "a victory for the people of Syria and Lebanon and the entire Arab nation" and that his country would "remain alongside Lebanon in its struggle for independence and sovereignty," even though his army remained an occupying force in the country.

In a recent interview with the newspaper 'L'Orient-Le Jour', the former Lebanese president stated that Israel had also not really wanted to implement the May 17 agreement and accused it of having added "clauses at the last moment, on the previously negotiated text", including one that required the simultaneous withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon, which in practice gave Damascus veto power.

"It was a way of giving Damascus a veto (...) Especially since we had no control over the decision regarding the withdrawal of the Syrian army," he said.

An Iranian veto?

When asked about this Lebanese-Israeli precedent in relation to the current situation, Sami Nader, director of the Institute of Political Sciences at the Saint Joseph University of Beirut, pointed out that the regional context is totally different from that of 1983.

"At that time, only Anwar al-Sadat's Egypt had signed a peace agreement with Israel," he explained, noting that the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan later acceded to the Abraham Accords under President Donald Trump, while Jordan had signed a peace treaty in 1994. "Today, even Syria, which was once the main obstacle to the May 17 agreement, is willing to sign with the Israelis."

Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Charaa, told a diplomatic forum in Turkey on Friday that he was open to direct negotiations with Israel over the occupied Golan Heights if a security agreement guaranteed Israeli withdrawal from the newly occupied Syrian territories.

"In 1983, Hezbollah, which had just been founded, still had no say in Lebanon. Today it is the main obstacle to such negotiations, as is its Iranian sponsor, which opposes regional normalization efforts with Israel," Nader said.

Direct talks between Lebanon and Israel would deprive Tehran of its influence, he added, because Iran wants Lebanon — through Hezbollah — to remain a strategic card.

Read alsoAttacks and seizures: Hormuz consolidates itself as the new battlefield after extension of the truce

A "yellow line" that "sows doubt"

Nader also pointed out a "fundamental difference" between the 1982 Israeli invasion and the current one, "due to the famous yellow line drawn by the Netanyahu government, which isolates part of the devastated and depopulated territory."

Israeli authorities claim to have drawn a "yellow line" inside southern Lebanon, claiming its goal is to protect communities in northern Israel from Hezbollah attacks.

In Lebanon, the buffer zone — stretching hundreds of square kilometers from the Mediterranean coast to the Lebanese-Syrian border — is seen by many as a new unilateral border drawn by Israel.

In Gaza, a similar "yellow line" established after the October ceasefire divides the territory from north to south between an area controlled by Hamas and another de facto controlled by the Israeli army.

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This yellow line "casts doubt on Israeli intentions," Nader insisted. "Because it is reminiscent of a scenario already seen in the Syrian Golan — an annexation scenario — and no observer can rule out that possibility with the far-right government currently led by Israel."

"Even more than President Gemayel in 1983, President Aoun seems to believe that the only way for Lebanon to rule out such a scenario is to negotiate, that is, to seek peace and, therefore, in a certain sense, the disarmament of Hezbollah, in exchange for the conquered territory (...) Because the other option, the military one defended by the Shiite party, allows the Israelis to justify their occupation of southern Lebanon," he concluded.

Read alsoReport from Beirut: Lebanon's requests in a new round of negotiations with Israel

This article was adapted from its original French version.

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